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Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy:
Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA
Chapter 11

A riAfilalo *
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
benignly named the "Investment Chapter," is a theater for some of the most
advanced issues of

2 1st

century international law and adjudication.

The

Chapter gives private parties the right to challenge national policies that
burden their ability to do business freely.1 It empowers arbitral tribunals to
assess damages against the governments of NAFTA parties.
The
adjudicators, as this Article illustrates, render opinions with a constitutional
flavor in that they assess the validity of domestic norms against larger
principles of international economic law.2 In a drastic move away from
classical century international law that is reminiscent of the system of
judicial remedies ushered into the European Union,3 the Investment Chapter
binds governments by empowering panels to render damage awards against
national governments that are enforceable in national courts.
As is the case with the World Trade Organization (WTO), we are
witnessing in the scholarship and popular commentary the formation of a
familiar divide between competing claims that advance the core arguments
for or against Chapter 11 but, although sophisticated and nuanced, tend not

Ari Afilalo is an associate professor of law at Rutgers-Camden School of Law. This article
benefited greatly from comments given by the participants in the Rutgers-Camden Junior
Faculty Colloquium. My research assistant, Juli Schwartz, was more of a research partner
than an assistant. All of her outstanding contributions, from conceptual to technical, are
much appreciated.
See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11,
32 I.L.M. 605, 639 (1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
*

2 See id; see also infra note 18 and accompanying text.

3 See Weiler, infra, note 18; NAFTA's Investment Chapter infra note 27.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

25:279 (2005)

to have much common ground.4 Familiar voices from affiliates of what
may be termed the anti-globalization movement rail against NAFTA's
Chapter 11. These voices argue that neoclassical economic principles are
now embodied in a dangerous and powerful legal weapon. Unlike the
WTO, which at least has the ability to confine itself to state-to-state
disputes, they argue, the Investment Chapter allows private business
interests to challenge health, labor, taxation, procurement, and other
policies that are mainstays of democratic lawmaking in the democratic
nation-state as we know it. 6 These self-interested economic forces, critics
fear, may find a sympathetic ear in international NAFTA panels which may
favor laissez faire norms that tend to facilitate the cross-border flow of
capital. In turn, the critics also argue that these NAFTA panels lack the
hallmarks of legitimacy that characterize courts in our modem
democracies.8 They claim that decisions need not be justified, appeals are
not allowed except on highly limited grounds, the process lacks
transparency, and yet NAFTA panels have the power to invalidate
democratically adopted rules. 9 Those suspicious of Chapter 11, then, claim
that at a minimum the Treaty is fundamentally flawed because it gives
individuals the right to extract from national governments payment for
damages arising out of a breach of international economic law, thereby
creating the functional equivalent of judicial review of domestic law under
ambiguous international norms applied by illegitimate tribunals.
In response, supporters of Chapter 11 argue that the cross-border
creation of capital and economic opportunity is essential to international
economic development. 10 They assert that the free flow of cross-border
investment is conditioned on the presence of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence and a modicum of protection that approximates standards in
the investor's home jurisdiction.' By accomplishing this goal, Chapter 11
4 Compare Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face ofInvestment

Arbitration:NAFTA Chapter11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (2003), and Charles H. Brower, II,
NAFTA 's Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation Rights, 36 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1533 (2003), with PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TOSTATE CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/

documents/ACF 186.PDF (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
5 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 4.
61d.

7 Id.
8 See, e.g., NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go
Too Far,CriticsSay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 3421720.
9 Id.

10Alvarez & Park, supra note 4.
I Since the 1980's, there has been an astonishing increase in the number of bilateral or
trilateral investment treaties. It is unclear whether these treaties are merely symbolic, i.e.
signaling a country's philosophical approach toward foreign investment, or true facilitators
of foreign direct investment. Regardless of the answer to this empirical question, the
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clears the way for a freer flow of capital across borders, which will channel
benefits to the host economies even if their ability to regulate the allocation
of those benefits is somewhat limited by international norms. 12 In other
words, treaties such as Chapter 11 arguably protect less developed countries
from their own misplaced protectionist urges, much like good governance
principles enshrined in the WTO norms tend to prevent domestic interests
from imposing self-destructive protective barriers to trade.' 3 As further
explained below, the core provisions of Chapter 11 prevent the host
jurisdiction from imposing measures traditionally followed in developing
countries. Thus, the international law embodied in NAFTA establishes
minimum levels of protection against takings without compensation at fair
market value, discriminatory treatment, and arbitrary government action,14
thereby clearing the way for the creation of capital and economic activity.
The argument concludes that the enforcement of these regulations in the
NAFTA panels is necessary to protect against the risk that domestic judges
will refuse to recognize the norms' validity.
In sum, proponents argue, the Chapter merely reflects international
custom regarding the economic security for foreigners, and actually helps
and promotes economic activity in developing countries. Furthermore, they
argue the legitimacy challenge to the Treaty is not warranted. Who, then, is
afraid of Chapter 11, and why?
Criticism of the Treaty spans the political, academic, lobbying and
juridical spectrum. 5 The root cause of the crisis, I argue, is the
combination of the ambiguity inherent in the Treaty, its potential to
invalidate sensitive domestic norms if the ambiguous language of the
Treaty is not properly interpreted, the power given to arbitrators to engage
in the functional equivalent of judicial review of democratically enacted
existence of over one thousand treaties, and the potential use of Chapter 11 as a model for
the investment chapter of the Free Trade of the Areas Agreement, show that the answer to
the questions raised by this Article are not merely academic. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The
Economics ofBilateralInvestment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 469, 469-470 (2000).
12 See Charles N. Brower & John Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States: A Reflection or Rejection of InternationalLaw? 9 INT'L LAW 295 (1975).
13 See J.H.H. WEILER & SUNGJOON CHO, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL TRADE LAW:
LAW
OF
THE
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION
(2004)
available at

THE

www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wto/PDF-files/WTO_2004_Unitl.pdf

(last visited Jan. 5,

2005). See also Brett Williams, The Influence and Lack of Influence of Principles in the
Negotiationsfor China's Access to the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 791, 839-40 (2001) (arguing that the WTO treaties not only regulate relations between
states but also regulate relations between citizens within states and act as counterweights to
groups that lobby the government to adopt policies that are inequitable and welfare
decreasing).
14 See infra notes 42 through 57.
15For a discussion of how the critics of Chapter 11 may be found across the American
political, judicial, academic, and advocacy spectrum, see, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 4.
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norms, and the classic conflict between laissez faire norms and domestic
regulation that infuse the debate over Chapter 11. This conflict may rise to
the level. of an "existential crisis"-if interpreted too broadly without due
regard for its context and objective, Chapter 11 may bring general claims
for violations of international law within the ambit of private party dispute
resolution. 16
As the European integration experience has demonstrated, and as is
addressed later in this Article, even if most domestic measures survive
international scrutiny, the very possibility that an international tribunal
might engage in "constitutional" review of domestic norms (forcing the
defendant government to litigate) will create legitimacy concerns. Chapter
11, in turn, is a prime candidate for a severe crisis of legitimacy; it involves
substantive norms that may be construed to override domestic law in
several crucial areas, all the while establishing a "judicial-constitutional"
system akin to that which obtains in Europe, but without the sophisticated
judicial and institutional system of the European
Union and the intricate
17
dialogue between the various European actors.
To resolve these concerns, I put forth in prior writings proposals for
the interpretation of Chapter 11 within a common law framework, while
articulating some broad norms that should guide NAFTA Chapter 11 panels
when engaging in the review of the legality of validly enacted domestic
norms under the aegis of supranational standards.1 8 I defined a "spectrum
of integration;" one that would establish doctrinal principles applicable to
various free trade and other integrated areas, and provided parameters for
the jurisprudential direction of these proposed common law trade
tribunals. I argued that we may understand Chapter 11, based on its place
along the spectrum of integration, to incorporate two fundamental

16 Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA
Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 51
(2004) [hereinafter Legitimacy Crisis].
17The classical exposition of the transformation of Europe from an aggregation of
sovereign nation-states into an integrated area bearing constitutional hallmarks of a
"Federation" or other unitary entity may be found in Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, reprintedin JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE:

"Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). One of the important themes in the narrative recounted by
Professor Weiler is the elimination of the Member States' ability to "selectively exit" the
supranational system to protect their domestic interests. The removal of selective exit was a
byproduct of the establishment of national courts empowered (and that proved willing) to
apply European law and enforce it against their own governments. As I elaborate further in
this Article, the removal of selective exit is also one of the features of the Investment
Chapter of NAFTA.
18 Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16.
19 Id.
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principles: a ban on discrimination and a ban on arbitrary behavior.
I
concluded that, if properly limited to focusing on rooting out these two
kinds of prohibited conduct, the Chapter would achieve its intended goal
If so interpreted, I believe, the
without threatening domestic values.'
Chapter 11 arbiters may stake a claim to place of distinction in international
law and in the debate over constitutionalization: their work would breathe
further life into the common law of international trade concept described by
Professor Weiler, by developing and applying legal norms that, while
borrowing from other areas of international trade law, would properly
circumscribe NAFTA to its legitimate place in the spectrum of integration.
In this article, I analyze two recent decisions of NAFTA Chapter 11
panels in cases that implicated highly sensitive domestic interests: The
Loewen Group and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, 23 and Mondev
InternationalLtd. v. United States.24 My goal is to demonstrate, through
these cases, that the NAFTA panels reached the correct result but failed to
articulate a methodological approach and criteria that may be used to guide
subsequent panels in applying the Treaty and resolving its ambiguity and
potential legitimacy problems. In addition to the discrimination and
arbitrariness guideposts, I will show that the panels should have expressly
articulated prudential principles for circumscribing the scope of Chapter 11,
bringing it in line with the purpose of the system. I will also argue that the
panels de facto rejected a rigid and formalistic approach in favor of a
pragmatic approach that takes into account the political reality of
constituent states' view of trade obligations. The panels indicated their
willingness to move towards jurisprudence that takes into account the
political and social reality of their domestic interlocutors, and their reaction
to the perceived intrusion of trade norms on domestic subject matter. This
move, however, was largely unspoken, and I will argue that the acceptance
of the Chapter by domestic constituencies will depend on its interpreters'
future willingness to articulate their methodological interpretation
explicitly, thereby resolving the Treaty's crisis of legitimacy. Thus, my
argument is that Chapter I 1's ambiguity problem could in fact be resolved
if the treaty's scope is limited and its decisions are guided by a growing
20
21

Id. at 44, 47.
Id. In this Article, I review only the national treatment and international law provisions

of the Treaty.

22 See THE EU, THE WTO, AND NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

TRADE 1-4, 201-31 (J.H.H. Weiler, ed., Oxford Uni'v. Press 2000) [hereinafter TOWARDS A
COMMON LAW].
23 International Centre for Settlement of Investor Disputes, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3. The
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3
87
(June 26, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/22094.pdf.
24 Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
(Oct. 11, 2002) at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
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body of "common law" of international trade, but that the panels should
explicitly articulate their methodological approach.
This article proceeds in three parts. Section II outlines Chapter 1l's
history and the norms enshrined in the Treaty to the extent necessary for the
reader to understand the thrust of the article's argument without having to
refer to outside sources. Section III summarizes the two cases that are the
subject of this article with a view to demonstrating how Chapter 11 's three
pillars-international law, national treatment, and takings-implicate the
policy concerns described in this introduction. Section IV offers a potential
solution to these difficulties, arguing that the panels should explicitly
articulate and start applying principles of common law of international trade
that are in accord with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Professor
Weiler's observation that the legal frameworks of various international
bodies are becoming more and more interconnected guides our
understanding of the boundary between investment law under Chapter 11
and other areas of law such as WTO trade law or separate bodies of
international law. 25 I will argue that principles of international trade law
that are articulated by the WTO can, if properly transplanted into the
context of investment law, supplY6 new rules by which Chapter 11 panels
may legitimately adjudicate cases.2 The benefit will be two-fold. First, by
interpreting Chapter 11 properly, Chapter 11 will serve its original object
and purpose of providing neutral, minimally protective rules of investment
law, thereby facilitating foreign direct investment, without unduly
infringing on national sovereignty. Second, Chapter 11 would provide a
jurisprudential and methodological model for construing international
investment rules that are born out of the battles of the 2 0 th century, in the
business context of the 2 1st century, and it would further and continue the
common law of trade enterprise.
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
A. Background
The history of Chapter 11 has been recounted elsewhere, and need not
be entirely restated here again.2 7 Suffice it to say, for purposes of this
Article, that the United States, Canada and Mexico had, before NAFTA,
fundamentally divergent views of the contours of the customary
25TOWARDS A COMMON LAW, supra note 22, at 1-4.
26 Cf Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16.
27 See, e.g., CHARLES A. JONEs, THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: A BRIEF HISTORY 72-73
(1983); Ari Afilalo, ConstitutionalizationThrough the Back Door: A EuropeanPerspective
on NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 13-19 (2001) [hereinafter
NAFTA's Investment Chapter]; Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibilityfor the
Nationalizationof Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 179 (1978).
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international law of investment. 28 The United States, at bottom, advocated
a formally neutral set of principles that would ban discriminatory measures
and provide protection against takings without just compensation and other
government action viewed as arbitrary. 29 This position was challenged by
Mexico, which argued instead that less developed nations should be granted
preferential treatment. 30 Mexico's position reflected the post-colonial
critique that more laissez faire principles would entrench the unjust
enrichment of the "North"-a loose appellation for the industrialized
countries of Europe and for the United States-that resulted from years of
colonization.31
When the most contentious provisions of Chapter 11 were finally
agreed upon, their acceptance by Mexico signaled a decisive victory for the
United States-the Chapter's most ardent backer.32 Furthermore, Chapter
11 was supposed to presage an analogous investment chapter in the Free
Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA).33

The predictive significance of Chapter 11 stems not only from its
contents, but also from the players whose agreements it came to embody.
Mexico had traditionally acted as a leading advocate of the traditional
28 The disparities in economic strength between Mexico and the United States (and
Canada) was cause for concern in the "North" as well as the "South." In the United States,
the 1992 election campaign featured the famous "Great Sucking Sound" comment from Ross
Perot, which captured the fear that the lower Mexican labor standards and wages would
"suck" American jobs down to Mexico (hence the "Sound"). This concern was shared by the
American labor unions, and it led President Clinton to negotiate the NAFTA "side agreement
on labor," which on paper compelled Mexico to enforce what turned out to be substantively
protective labor norms that the government simply ignored. See William F. Pascoe, Deja Vu
All Over Again? Collective Bargaining and NAFTA: Can Mexican and United States
National Unions Foster Growth under the NAALC?, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741
(2002). From the Mexican standpoint, the concerns about NAFTA centered on its opening
up borders for Northern employers to take advantage of cheaper labor, and repatriate profit
and know-how home without leaving behind tools of meaningful development needed by the
Mexican economy. See Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade
Agreement's Chapter11, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 303, 304 (1997).
29 See Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 28; Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment
Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987); Kevin Banks, Can Regulation Be Expropriation?, 5
NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 499 (1999).
30 Sandrino, supra note 29; see also, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD
SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 382 (Brian Pearce trans.,

Monthly Review Press 1974).
31 World-systems analysis and dependency theory are two such examples of this
revisionist approach. See, e.g,. 3 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM:
THE SECOND ERA OF GREAT EXPANSION OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY 1730-1840s

(1989).
32See NAFTA's Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 19.
33 Sandrino, supra note 29; see also Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 28.

285
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developing countries' position on custom. The United States, for its part,
firmly advocated the conflicting views of custom advocated by the North
(summarized below). Mexico and like-minded countries argued that when
political control over colonies was discontinued, it would also be necessary
to take affirmative measures (including discriminatory action) to end
economic subjugation by the colonizers' companies (which were viewed as
economic agents of Northern domination) and to give the colonized nations
the opportunity to achieve meaningful development.34 The United States,
for its part, pushed for the national treatment and protective rules that were
ultimately embodied in Chapter 11.35 When Mexico accepted the United
States' view that colonization did not justify discrimination, arbitrary
measures or takings, the international investment community predicted that
future bilateral or regional investment treaties would follow suit. 36 In
particular, it was thought that Chapter 11 would be the road map for the
FTAA, and would protect investments throughout this future free trade
area-"from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. 37
B. Structure of Chapter 11
NAFTA's "Investment Chapter," as written, set forth investment
standards pertaining to three essential substantive topics (i.e. three "pillars"
or "disciplines"): customary international law, national treatment, and
takings.38 It also established its own arbitral panels to hear disputes arising
under any of the three subject areas.3 9 The next subsections briefly review
each of the pillars of Chapter 11. The Article then moves on to outlining its
dispute resolution system, with a view to providing the background
necessary for the ensuing discussion.
34See generally Sandrino, supra note 29; see also PETER J.

BURNELL, ECONOMIC

NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD 243-44 (Westview Press, 1996).

35See Ari Afilalo, Not in My Backyard: Power and Protectionism in US. Trade
Policy,
34 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 749 (2002) [hereinafter Not In My Backyard].
36 Sandrino, supra note 29.
37This motto first appeared at a Free Trade of the Americas summit. The allusion refers
to free customs zones and their potential impact on member economies. See, e.g., Jon M.
Tate, Sweeping Protectionism Under the Rug: Neoprotectionist Measures among Mercosur
Countries in a Time of Trade-liberalization,27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389 (1999).
38I use these terms, borrowed from the European Union and WTO terminology,
interchangeably to refer to the main provisions of Chapter 11. It is common knowledge that,
aside from creating a unique dispute resolution framework, the essential provisions of
Chapter 11 include the three disciplines of national treatment, takings and minimum

standards of protection under international law. See, e.g, Daniel M. Price, 17th Annual
Symposium, Investment, Sovereignty, and Justice: Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11:
Some Observations on ChapterEleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 421

(2000) (offering a brief overview of NAFTA by one of its chief negotiators for the United
States).
39NAFTA, supra note 1, at ch. 11.
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1. InternationalLaw

Article 1105 is the international law pillar of Chapter 11. Under this
Article, the governments of all member' nations must afford a level of
protection to foreign investors that complies with minimal requirements of
customary international law: "[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. ' 4°
The lynchpin principle behind Article 1105 is the protection of business
operations outside the investor's jurisdiction from arbitrary government
action. 4' Arbitrariness may come in various forms. For example, a shakeup
in the government of a given country may result in attempts to cancel
government contracts entered into by the previous ruling group. 42 A
jurisdiction may fail to provide access to a justice system that satisfies
minimum requirements, or that denies basic rights to foreign economic
interests.43 Article 1105 attempts to establish the minimum level of
economic security that is thought to be a condition precedent to investment
flowing into a particular jurisdiction.44
This international law pillar squarely rejected the view customarily
adopted by Mexico. Mexico's objection to the U.S.-backed version was
twofold. First, Mexico noted that substantive legal rights and, specifically,
concepts like "arbitrariness," are not universal but particular; their
applications are determined by the cultural, political or socioeconomic
contexts in which they are found.
Secondly, Mexico maintained,
developing economies must be flexible in their policy assessments; changes
40

NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1105.

41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 712
(1987); NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions (July 31, 2001) available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca\tna-nac\nafta-intrpre.asp [hereinafter NAFTA Notes of Interpretation]. For example, a contract that the
government cancels for no explicable reason outside of its desire to advantage domestic
competitors, will probably be in breach of Article 1105. Initially, however, there was some
question as to whether or not the treaty norms themselves could be considered part of
"international law," which would essentially render the proviso moot. To avoid this problem,
the FTC specifically declared international law to mean "customary" international law only.
I will return to this point in Part II.
42 See Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 57.
43See generally Renee Lettow Lerner, InternationalPressure to Harmonize: The U.S.
Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 233 (stating
"NAFTA encompasses a substantive doctrine that capital-exporting countries have invoked
against less-developed countries: the prohibition of denial of justice"). See also,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987);
Brower & Tepe, supra note 12; Concerning the Chorzow Factory (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
44 See, e.g., JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS
71,811 (2002).
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of circumstances should be allowed to mitigate the enforcement of prior
trade agreements if the country's economic welfare is at stake. To insist
otherwise perpetuates the exploitive practices of ages past. 45 Again,
Chapter 11 embodied the formally neutral view of arbitrariness espoused by
the United States and other developed countries, thereby rejecting the
contextual arguments traditionally advanced by developing countries.
2. National Treatment
Similar considerations attended Chapter 1 's adoption of a national
treatment standard.
Article 1102 is designed to prevent domestic
governments from requiring foreign investors to confer benefits to the
domestic economy beyond those extended in the ordinary course of their
business, from imposing more burdens on foreign economic interests than
on domestic concerns, and from excluding foreigners from certain sectors
of the domestic economy.46 The Article states, "[e]ach Party shall accord to
investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords,
in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other
disposition of investments. ' 4 This is another straightforward rejection of
the position advocated by Mexico, which (again) had traditionally espoused
the view that formal discriminatory measures were necessary to redress
historical imbalances.
This formal equality standard was also enshrined in Article 1102's
companion, Article 1106.
This Article prohibits the imposition of
"performance requirements." These measures were traditionally applied by
less developed countries to compel foreign companies to confer benefits to
the domestic economy beyond those transferred in the ordinary course of
business. Performance requirements included the achievement of a given
level or percentage of domestic content, the use of local goods or services,
or the transfer of technology or other know-how.4 8 Article 1102 reflects the
position of the United States that the incentive to invest in areas with
comparative advantage would disappear if the price-tag for doing so
entailed "nation-building" in the economic realm.49
In contrast, Mexico and like minded countries had traditionally
adhered to the position that formal discrimination might be justified as a
45See Bums H. Weston, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States and the
Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L. L. 437 (1981); see also Schwebel,
The Story of the UN's Declaration on PermanentSovereignty over Natural Resources, 49
A.B.A. J. 463 (1963); Alvarez, supra note 28.
46See Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 60-61.
47NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1102 (emphasis added).
41Id. at art. 1106.
49See Brower, supra note 4.
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means of redressing historical wrongs. Under this view, developing
countries could adopt measures such as the "performance requirements" so
as to aid domestic development in ways more meaningful than if the foreign
undertakings operated in the ordinary course of business under the same
rules that applied to domestic concerns. The forced use of domestic
suppliers or the transfer of capital or intellectual property to the local
economy would, under this view, provide the domestic economy a lift that
would partially compensate for the harm caused by colonization and other
forms of perceived subjugation. Again, Article 1102 squarely rejected
Mexico's view that these measures were necessary to generate economic
self-determination as a necessary companion to decolonization and political
independence."0
3. Takings

Finally, Chapter 11 addressed the complex issue of expropriation in its
section on takings. Article 1110 adopts a position similar to that embodied
in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution: "[n]o party may directly
or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization
or expropriation of such an investment except: a) for a public purpose; b) on
a non-discriminatory basis;.. .and d) on payment of compensation...
equivalent to the fair market value of the exropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place."
The Article further
52
mandates prompt payment in full in cases where a taking has occurred.
These stipulations put Chapter 1l's definition of expropriation on equal
footing with the doctrine of eminent domain as embodied in U.S. case law
on substantive due process. Without such requirements, the United
States
53
feared cross-border capital flow would be significantly impeded.
Here again, Mexico championed the view that developing countries
ought to be exempt from these takings provisions in order to correct
historical disadvantage.54 Proponents of this position claimed that a
developing nation should only be required to pay what is "appropriate"
under the circumstances.5 5 This meant that seizure of investment property
50

id.

51NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1110.
52 Id.

53 See Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16; Vandevelde, supra note 11.
54 See Sandrino, supra note 29 at 271-72.
55 Id. at 218-19; see also Bums H. Weston, Constructive Takings under International
Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of 'CreepingExpropriation,' 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103

(1975). To illustrate how divergent initial views on this issue were, consider the United
States' further challenge to "creeping expropriation." This concept encompassed, among
other things, the arbitrary use of state power to deprive a property owner of all uses of her
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should be tolerated upon payment of compensation reasonable in light of
the social and economic condition of the relevant country; needless to say,
the United States rejected arguments of this type, and the United States'
position was fully embraced by Chapter 1 1.56
4. Standing and Dispute Resolution
In addition to the three substantive matters just discussed, Chapter 11
also deals with the essential questions of jurisdiction and dispute resolution.
Chapter 11 casts a broad net in its definition of "investors" and
"investments." Almost any individual conducting any kind of business in a
member country is covered under the chapter's provisions. 7 A nonexhaustive list of protected enterprises includes corporations, joint ventures,
partnerships, and limited liability companies.58 Further, many forms of
59
assets and asset ownership fall within the purview of Chapter 11.
Recognizing that structural and capital arrangements are not uniform, the
drafters' intent was to prevent member governments from circumventing
provisions of NAFTA because of legal technicalities or investors' choice of
business form. 60 As a result what may be understood as the scope of
personal jurisdiction under the Chapter is expansive.6 1
Chapter 11 panels hear disputes arising under Chapter I's substantive
requirements, and are intended to give plaintiffs a supranational remedyfree of domestic interference-for NAFTA violations.62 Again, it was the
United States that successfully lobbied for the supremacy of international
tribunals.63 Prior to acquiescing, Mexico was steadfast in its adherence to
64
the "Calvo Doctrine," which protects the jurisdiction of national courts.
Named after the Argentinean scholar who coined it, the doctrine essentially
holds that economic and political self-determination is not complete unless

property, forcing a sale at much less than fair market value. For example, a developing
country might, without legitimate grounds, deny a permit necessary to keep a factory in
operation. Technically, the factory would not be "taken," but its owner would lose the power
to operate it. The government would then make an offer of purchase at a price much lower
than its fair market value; in effect, amounting to uncompensated nationalization.
56 See NAFTA's Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 14-15.
57 See Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at nn. 54-61
58NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 1139 & 201.
9
1d. 605, art. 1139.
60 Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 61-62.
61 See Price, supra note 38.
62 Gregory M. Starner, Taking a Constitutional Look: NAFTA Chapter 11 as an
Extension of Member States' ConstitutionalProtection of Property, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 405, 413 (2002), citing MEX. CONST. ch. I, art. 27, reprintedin XII CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD

(Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz, eds., 1998).

See NAFTA's Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 16-17.
64 See CHARLES M. CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 348 (5th ed. 1896).
63
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national judges, applying national law, have the exclusive right to apply the
domestic law. 65 It is a rejection of the Western position that supranational
norms, applied by supranational arbiters, should govern international
investment.66 In Chapter 11, the United States, skeptical that nations with a
traditional philosophical tendency to ignore private property rights so as to
redress historical injustice could adequately protect cross-border capital,
prevailed in its efforts and achieved an agreement that many thought would
sound the death toll of the Calvo Doctrine.6 7

Chapter 11 created dispute resolution tribunals that operate under the
aegis of either the World Bank or the United Nations. In either forum, a
defendant government must pay the aggrieved investor compensatory
damages when a substantive breach has occurred. 68 The system further
specifies that the central government of any such defendant is held
vicariously liable for the acts of subordinate branches: regional, provincial,
municipal, state or local.69 In other words, a breach of Chapter 11 by the
State of Mississippi is actionable against the government of the United
States, which would be required to compensate the private investor for any
damages causally related to the breach. This70measure, of course, raises the
stakes, and thus, the degree of accountability.
The awards rendered by Chapter 11 panels are enforceable by national
courts. Under the rules applicable to awards rendered by the Investor for
the Settlement of Investor Disputes (ICSID), a national court may refuse to
enforce the award if it is tainted by procedural irregularities (i.e., lack of
integrity in the arbitration "process"). 71 The review rules applicable to
awards rendered by panels operating under the aegis of the U.N. tribunals,
the standard of review also allows courts to take public policy into
account.72

65 id.
66 See, e.g, David E. Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual
Renunciation of Diplomatic Protection,6 TEX. INT'L L.J. 289-90 (1971); see also Manuel R.
Garcia-Mora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions and InternationalLaw, 33
MARQ. L. REv. 205, 219 (1950). The Calvo Doctrine, which makes the competence of
Mexico's national courts absolute, has longstanding resonance in Mexican jurisprudence and
appears in the national constitution.
67 See NAFTA's Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 17.

68 Id. at 12.

In the case of the United States of course, the federal government is liable.
See NAFTA's Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 19; see also Naomi Gal-Or,
Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and EU Disciplines, 21 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1998); Charles Brower, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA:
The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001).
71 This standard of review is reminiscent of the one applied by federal courts in domestic
commercial arbitration.
72 Brower, supra note 70, at 49.
69
70
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II. THE CASES
In this Section, I describe the background of the Mondev and Loewen
cases and provide an analysis of each.7 I will then explain in Section V
how each case raises the problems of meaning, ambiguity and legitimacy. I
will then argue that, although the result reached by the panels is correct,
they failed to articulate a methodology that accords with international legal
principles of interpretation and to engage explicitly in a common law
development of the relevant principles that would properly circumscribe
Chapter 11 in light of this object and purpose. This jurisprudential failure
of the panels will undermine the usefulness of their opinions as guideposts
for future decision-making. The background review of the cases set forth in
this Section is necessary to understand the problems analyzed later.
The issue in Mondev v. U.S. would have normally been a generic
tortious interference with contract claim if it had been confined to a dispute
between private parties, or if the plaintiff had not been Canadian. Instead, it
gave rise to an international challenge against an important provision of
American tort law and civil procedure.
Mondev, a Canadian development corporation, accused the Boston
Redevelopment Association (BRA) of obstructing its performance of an
option contract. 74 Mondev's Massachusetts-based subsidiary entered into
an agreement with the BRA and the City of Boston that gave Mondev the
right and option to purchase a property at a given phase of the contract.75
The contract further specified the date by which the option would expire if
not exercised, provided that both parties worked in good faith to close
acquisition of the property.7 6 Mondev claimed that its failure to make good
on the option in a timely fashion was due to the BRA's
deliberate attempts
77
to forestall purchase of the redevelopment property.
In 1994, Mondev brought suit in a Massachusetts court against the
City of Boston and the BRA. The jury found that both defendants had not
acted in good faith and were therefore liable for damages. 79 The judge,
however, set aside the verdict because the state legislature had specifically

73 Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
(Oct. 11, 2002) at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf (last visited Aug.
4, 2004); The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/(AF)/98/3
87 (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/22094.pdf.
74 See Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.
71 Id. 38.
76 id.
77

id. 1.

75

71

1d. 739.
Id. 40.
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granted immunity from lawsuit to municipal agencies. 80 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal, and ordered all claims against
the City of Boston and its agents to be dismissed.8' Mondev subsequently
filed for a rehearing before the Massachusetts high court, and then
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari; the Canadian corporation
was unsuccessful on both counts.
Having exhausted its remedies under U.S. law, Mondev looked into
possible NAFTA Chapter 11 claims. Mondev argued that Article 1105 (the
international law prong of Chapter 11) was applicable, on the grounds
(among other arguments) that the Supreme Judicial Court's unwillingness
to waive appellees' grant of statutory immunity was a violation of
NAFTA's
84 international law pillar.83 It filed for arbitration before a NAFTA
panel. The panel engaged at length in a discussion of the issues at hand,
but ultimately it also ruled against Mondev.85 In reaching its decision, the
panel held that "investments of investors under NAFTA are entitled, under
the customary international law which the NAFTA Parties interpret Article
1105(1) to comprehend, to fair and equitable treatment and to full
protection and security," without specifying the core conceptual
components of such a body of customary international law. 86 The panel
then engaged in a review, under the amorphous principles which it found to
provide the applicable guidance, of each factual basis adduced by Mondev
in support of its complaint.87 After dismissing Mondev's challenges to the
legal analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court, the panel addressed the crux
of the complaint: the denial of an otherwise proper claim by a domestic
court on statutory immunity grounds.88
The panel stated, in dictum, that government, at any level, could not
categorically deny private litigants the opportunity to be compensated for
wrongdoing.
Regardless, the panel found that Massachusetts had acted
within the discretion afforded by international law. 90 Statutory immunity,
the panel reasoned, might be appropriate for a variety of reasons-e.g.
conserving government resources that might be expended defending
80 Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.
81Id. 1.
82 id.
83
84

Id. 93-156.
id. 1.

85 Id.

157.
Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
87 Id.
126-56.

86

88

Id.

125.

139-56.

Id.
151 ("In the Tribunal's opinion, circumstances can be envisaged where the
conferral of a general immunity from suit for conduct of a public authority affecting a
NAFTA investment could amount to a breach of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA.").
'0 Id. 156.
89
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frivolous lawsuits-and in the case at hand, the government had justifiable
grounds for granting immunity to its agencies. 9'
Furthermore, in a move whose significance is described below, the
NAFTA panel reiterated the necessity of showing a high degree of
deference to national courts, and refused to usurp their authority by acting
as an "international appellate court." 92 In the course of reviewing
Mondev's challenge to the legal analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court, the
panel stated that only cases involving blatant abuse of judicial discretion
supported a contrary finding by NAFTA.93 Furthermore, in a common law
system, as in the United States, deviations from precedent cannot be offered
as per se evidence that the verdict is an illegitimate one. 94
The Loewen opinion likewise relied substantially on Article 1105, and
it also addressed the plaintiffs argument under Article 1102. In The
Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., the NAFTA complainant challenged a sensitive
set of U.S. procedures and practices; specifically punitive damages,
unfettered jury verdicts, and the use of biases and xenophobic stereotypes in
95
trials that allegedly resulted in an unfair and disproportionate verdict.
Loewen, a Canadian funeral home conglomerate, challenged the outcome of
a Mississippi state trial that had ordered the company to pay $500,000,000
to a group of class-action plaintiffs for various claims under contract law.96
When Loewen initiated NAFTA proceedings for violations of Article 1105,
Article 1102 and Article 1110, there arose a fear that a ruling against the
United States would chip away at the cornerstone of the U.S. civil litigation
and erode domestic sovereignty over matters ofjustice.97
The original trial was a colorful one.98 A brilliant lawyer, Willie Gary,
tried the case in Hinds County, Mississippi. The son of African-American
migrant workers, Gary fought his way to become a highly successful trial
lawyer, and a larger than life character reminiscent of a John Grisham

91 Id.
92

Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,

126.

9'Id. 127, 133.
94Mondev also asserted secondary claims, questioning the integrity of the trial judge's
evidentiary rulings. NAFTA ruled in favor of the United States on these matters as well this
seems "slanted" a little too much. Id.
95The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/(AF)/98/3
87 (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/22094.pdf., at 87.
96 Id. 3-4.
97Alvarez & Park, supra note 4, at 381-83; Adam Liptkak, Review of US. Rulings by
Nafta Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 18, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR

4553718; The End of Sovereignty, CONN. LAW TRIB., May 17, 2004, at 21.
98 Charlotte Ku, Emerging Worldwide Strategies In InternationalizingLegal Education,
18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 493, 507 (2000) (citing Jonathan Harr, The Burial, THE NEW YORKER,
Nov. 1, 1999, at 70).
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hero.99 In this case, Gary argued that the Canadian "carpetbagger"
destroyed local competition, making inordinate profits off the backs of
Mississippi's dead in the process. Though a reasonable verdict in the
plaintiffs' favor would have cost no more than $10,000,000, Gary's
courtroom tactics were clearly intended to inflame the jurors' xenophobic
and class based tendencies.' 0 Seeing how a proper rite of passage to the
afterworld is serious business in Mississippi, the jury awarded damages
(including punitive damages) 5,000% greater than it ought to havesending Loewen a crystal-clear message.
Defeated and angered by what it perceived as a failure of justice
because of outrageous courtroom conduct, Loewen initiated proceedings
against the U.S. government under Chapter 11.102 Loewen argued that the
U.S. government, vicariously liable for the actions of Mississippi juries, had
violated each and every pillar of Chapter 11.103 Loewen claimed that it was
given discriminatory treatment as a foreigner, in violation of the national
treatment norm.'°4 It argued that the trial was so botched as to amount to a
denial of justice under customary international law and a violation of
Article 1105.105 Lastly, Loewen asserted that the verdict constituted a
taking of its property without compensation at fair market value in breach
of Article 1110 because the court and the jurors essentially expropriated his
money through an unwarranted verdict.' 0 These claims were premised in
large part on the argument that the punitive damages assessed in the case
violated international law, that procedural irregularities vitiated the
administration of justice in the case, that the trial judge was partial, and that
the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to reduce the appeals bonds
requirement that was a condition to its review of the case on account of a
politically motivated desire to let an illegal verdict stand. 0 7 Meanwhile,
99 See Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 65.

100Loewen, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,

68-70. As stated by the Panel:

When the trial is viewed as a whole right through from the voir dire to counsel's closing
address, it can be seen that the O'Keefe case was presented by counsel against an appeal to
home town sentiment, favoring the local party against an outsider. To that appeal was added
the element of the powerful foreign multi-national corporation seeking to crush the small
independent competitor who had fought for his country in World War II. Describing
"Loewen" as a Canadian was simply to identify him as an outsider.

Id. 70.
"' See id. 3-4, 39(3), 80, 92-93, 104, 106-14.
102Id. 4, 8.
103Id. 39-40.
'4 Id. 39.
105 Id.

106Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/I(AF)/98/3.
107Id. 39, 48.
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having gone through the proper appeals channels in state, Loewen agreed to
settle for $150,000,000,
under threat of seizure of its assets to satisfy the
08
larger verdict. 1
When the NAFTA tribunal finally issued its decision, it sided with
Loewen on the merits. 10 9 In dicta, the tribunal stated that the trial judge had
completely abdicated his responsibilities to ensure the defendant basic due
process and to rein in Willie Gary. 110 It agreed with the petitioner in its
assessment of the record: procedural gaffs had tainted the award of punitive
damages, which in any event were so disproportionate to actual damages as
to raise serious questions of fairness.11 ' However, the panel then dismissed
the case on the grounds that Loewen should not have brought its NAFTA
claims when it chose to before exhausting all possible remedies
under U.S.
12
law (petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari).'
The tribunal's decision, in my judgment, shows an internal tension.
On the one hand, the panel clearly believed that Loewen was denied justice.
At the same time the tribunal must have been acutely aware of the
onslaught in store for NAFTA Chapter 11 were it to rule against the United
States.' 13 The critics feared that the panel would elevate trade and
investment norms above the right of access to courts, protection of weaker
parties vis-A-vis unbounded corporate interests, contingency fee
arrangements enabling plaintiffs to retain talented but expensive attorneys,
award of punitive damages in deterrence of egregious conduct and basic
civil procedure within a federal system. 1t 4 Potentialconflict involving any
108 The lawsuit had proved to be a real thorn in Loewen's side, contributing to the
precipitous drop in its stock value. It was widely - and correctly - supposed that reaching
settlement would help reverse that effect.
109 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
53-70. While the panel's grounds for
dismissing the claims were technically procedural, the panel engaged nonetheless in a review
of the case on the merits and found for the United States.

11° Id. 87.
I Id. 122.
112 The NAFTA tribunal's dismissal made it unnecessary to consider other claims

asserted by Loewen. Those included a claim that Mississippi denied national treatment to
Loewen because its courts singled out the Canadian defendants for discriminatory treatment.
In addition, Loewen argued that the botched trial had "expropriated," de facto, the settlement
amount from the defendants. These claims stemmed from the primary grievance that the
United States' often-criticized tort system gave rise to an unusually wayward monetary
judgment in the case at hand. On this point, as explained above, the tribunal squarely
endorsed the defendant's position. Unfortunately, however, Loewen's failure to file for cert
in a timely fashion, as well as its executed settlement with the Mississippi plaintiffs,
precluded any future claims or issues from being brought in American courts-an incurable
defect, as it turns out, in its NAFTA proceedings.
113 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
1 (opening opinion with statement that
"this is an important and extremely difficult case.")
114 See Francisco S. Nogales, The NAFTA Environmental Framework, Chapter 11
Investment Provisions, and the Environment, 8 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 139
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one of these basic components was at the heart of their concern, with good
reason. 115 The implications of such potential conflict are discussed in the
following section, where I also argue that the Loewen panel should have
engaged in a common law articulation of jurisprudential concerns that
would insulate the Chapter from the adverse reaction that would have
resulted from a ruling against the United States.
IV. MEANING, AMBIGUITY AND LEGITIMACY
This Section discusses each of the pillars of Chapter 11 as illustrated
by the Mondev and Loewen cases. It exposes how these cases involved the
symptoms of the crisis of legitimacy that afflicts Chapter 11, which are
rooted in the ambiguity of the meaning of the Treaty. In each instance, the
supranational norm put pressure on a domestic choice in a sensitive area of
the law. In Loewen, the debate over tort reform taking place in U.S.
legislatures or election campaigns encountered the relatively widespread
hostility of other systems of law to allow the jury to award punitive
damages or to countenance contingency fees and other characteristics of the
U.S. judicial system as it currently stands. 116 In Mondev, the international
panel was asked to intervene in a domestic court's administration of a
statutory directive protecting public resources. In both instances, the
ambiguous meaning of the Treaty allowed for a review of the domestic
norm, resulting in a potential crisis of legitimacy.
A. The Problem of Meaning and Ambiguity in Defining Customary
International Law, National Treatment and International Takings Law, and
Its Impact on National Sovereignty
1. Article 1105
The ambiguity issues related to Article 1105 are illustrated by the
Mondev and Loewen proceedings. Article 1105, as its history indicates,
embodies the United States-backed principles of customary international
law that provide minimal levels of protection to foreigners. 1 7 The lynchpin
of the substantive rights protected by Article 1105 is the right to be free
from arbitrary government action. As will be discussed later, in the Loewen
and Mondev cases, the salient questions related to whether judicial and
statutory practices affecting access to justice constituted arbitrary denials of
(2002). See, e.g. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 4.
115 See my discussion of Torfaen Borough, infra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
116For a recent debate on tort reform, see Press Release, White House, President
Discusses Lawsuit Abuse at White House Economy Conference (Dec. 15, 2004), available
at 2004 WL 61639873 [hereinafter White House Conference].
117 NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1105.
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justice. "8

The language of Article 1105, however, like its companion pillars, is
laden with interpretative ambiguities. 19 Article 1105 is indiscriminate in its
reference to "international law."' 20 Read broadly, the Article might extend
jurisdiction to NAFTA panels any time business interests are affected by a
government measure that violates international law. The Free Trade
Commission's Interpretative Notes clarified that international law must
qualify as customary international law, and that a treaty provision would
not be actionable under Chapter 11.121 Presumably, however, a provision of
a treaty that has become a norm of customary international law could be the
basis for a cause of action. Also, as Mondev and Loewen demonstrate,
Chapter 11 panels may not even consider themselves bound by the FTC's
construction. 122 In all events, the amorphous language of Article 1105
opens the door to challenging any national measure that affects economic
interest and that may violate international law.
Loewen and Mondev illustrate these arguments. In Loewen, the crux of
the plaintiff's challenge was that the Mississippi tort system allowed the use
of stereotypes and xenophobic tactics to obtain disproportionate punitive
damages, thereby violating international law on minimum standards of
justice.1 23 Loewen had to attack the Mississippi Supreme Court's denial of
its petition to reduce the appeals bond, in order to have a clear government
action to challenge. However, its grievance was essentially with the
Mississippi trial. Loewen adduced an affidavit from a former president of
the International Court of Justice to argue that the imposition of punitive
damages in the case was a violation of international law. 24 Loewen's
NAFTA pleadings were replete with anecdotal evidence of the failure of the
Mississippi trial court to adhere to due process, and its allowing highly
prejudicial 2evidence
for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury against the
5
defendant.1
By way of example, the trial judge allowed the plaintiffs to call in
Mike Espy, a former Congressman from the Mississippi Delta and
Agriculture Secretary under President Clinton, to testify that O'Keefe (a
white plaintiff) was a good friend of the African American community.
118 See infra notes 140-48.

119 The potential breadth of the language led to the drafting of the FTC's Interpretive
Notes. See NAFTA Notes of Interpretation, supra note 41.
120 NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1105.
121NAFTA Notes of Interpretation, supranote 41.
122 Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
94-127.
123 Loewen, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
68-70.
124 See Affidavit of Sir Robert Jennings, on file with author.
125 id.
126 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3.
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Espy's testimony was part of a three-prong strategy clearly intended to
appeal to the predominantly African American jury. 127 In addition to
Espy's testimony, other statements made and evidence introduced at trial
included repeated negative references to the "Canadians" as alien corporate
interests bent on taking advantage of the good people of Mississippi in their
very hour of sorrow.'
Willie Gary went as far as to compare the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor to the Canadian "descent upon Mississippi" and to
distribute flyers in town that featured the Canadian flag side by side with
the Japanese one. 129 The "corporate monster" theme was sounded
effectively throughout the trial, with repeated references to meeting held by
a cigar smoking Loewen on a fancy yacht, with which130 the humble and
down to earth Mr. O'Keefe had a difficult time adjusting.
The meaning and ambiguity problem arises because the mere reference
to "international law," albeit customary, does nothing to distinguish
between the international law that is actionable under Article 1105 and that
which is not. Loewen involved the tension between international custom
and a distinctly U.S. practice-the award of punitive damages to deter
wrongful behavior through a system of contingent fee lawyers with some
latitude to appeal to the prejudices of a virtually all-powerful jury.
International practice does not necessarily conform to the U.S. practice of
awarding punitive damages, and the international law ambiguity as to what
is permissible in the way of punitive damages gave Loewen an opening to
bring a private action to challenge the Mississippi proceedings.131 Without
a guidepost for deciding which international law displaces domestic norms,
Article 1105 becomes a mere conduit for incorporating norms of
international law (as the panel might understand them) into the domestic
legal system.
The related legitimacy problem arises because the international arm
attempts to reach deep within a debate that is national in nature and touches
on sensitive domestic chords. Judicial practices and tort reform have
hovered over Congress, state legislatures, federal and state courts and (of
late) the presidential campaign.
The debate pits familiar opponents on
127

Id.

60-62, 72. This strategy consisted of encouraging discrimination based on race,

class and nationality.
128 Id. 32, 39.
129 Id.
131 See id. 68.
131See Shelby D. Green, Specific Relieffor Ancient Deprivationof Property, 36 AKRON
L. REv. 245 (2003); Michael Reisman & Monica Hakimi, Illusion and Reality in the
Compensation of Vicitims ofInternationalTerrorism, 54 ALA. L. REv. 561 (2003); cf Phillip
I. Blumberg, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: Asserting Human Rights
Against MultinationalCorporations Under United States Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 504-

06 (2002).
132White House Conference, supra note 116; Lewis H. Lapham, Tentacles of Rage: The
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the American scenes against one other. Plaintiffs lawyers and consumer
advocates are fighting ostensibly to promote corporate accountability
through the threat of a lawsuit. Business interests counter that the consumer
will ultimately suffer the cost of lawsuits that are often thought to be
frivolous, and that economic growth requires that the contingency fee
system be reined in. As Professor Daniela Caruso has explained in the
European context, the private law system is highly resistant to interference
by an international body or set of norms in its administration by judges and
like officers. 33 In turn, as will be further explained below, how to conduct
litigation, who should have access to justice, and how our system of law
should be handled are domestic sovereign matters that, when scrutinized
under international raise, raise legitimacy concerns in that all of these issues
are essential components of the private law system.
Similar issues arose in the Mondev cases, albeit in a different context.
There, the issue related to statutory immunity.134 Again, as Mondev
demonstrates, international law has a say on how far a State may go in
depriving a plaintiff of access to justice. 35 The Massachusetts practice,
however, was challenged under open ended language of Article 1105, and
the case illustrates that without additional interpretative tools Article 1005
may graft international law (as interpreted by the panel) into domestic law
in a wholesale fashion. 136 In turn, as in Loewen, the international rules
affected highly sensitive issues of domestic private law and of
governmental immunity from suit, which essentially deal with the extent to
which the taxpayer should pay for errors made by the government. 13 7 As
further explained below, the very fact that these issues would be litigated
before an international arbitral tribunal raised serious questions of
legitimacy.
Republican Propaganda Mill, a Brief History, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1, 2004, at 31;

Stephanie Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance Industry and the
GOP Promote the Myth of America's "Lawsuit Crisis," WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2004, at
18.
133Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigmof

EuropeanLegal Integration, 3 EuR. L.J. 3 (1997).
134
Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
139-56.
135Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating To International
Law, State Responsibility, and Liability: The Denial of Justice Standard in International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 438 (2003); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh
Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1027, 1096-97
(2002); cf Roger H. Taylor, Note, Pinochet,Confusion, and Justice: The Denial of Immunity
in US. Courts to Alleged Torturers Who Are Former Heads of State, 24 T.JEFFERSON L.
REv. 101 (2001) (discussing principles of head of state immunity that are applicable to
statutory immunity).
"' Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1105, with NAFTA Notes of Interpretation,
supra note 41.

137Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3.
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2. Article 1102

Article 1102 presents similar problems of interpretation. Article 1102
refers to "national treatment" with respect to investment, and it does not
distinguish between investment cases and those under the WTO that
address more sensitive issues of international trade law, such as how to deal
with regulatory disparities among various jurisdictions (especially among
developed and developing countries). 138 This textual ambiguity stems from
the impossibility of distinguishing between traders and investors. By
definition, trade is carried out by enterprises and their owners, the
"investors" that Chapter 11 has in mind. When it requires states to afford
national treatment to these investors, Chapter 11 is in effect replicating
textually the WTO's national treatment norm. Hence, as is the case with
respect to the international law pillar of the Chapter, Article 1102 has the
potential to swallow and bring within the ambit of private party litigation
greater issues of international law that traditionally are resolved either
diplomatically or through infrequent, selective state-to-state dispute
resolution, such as cases brought before the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body. 139

The problem is compounded because the WTO itself is laden with
ambiguity. The upshot is that Chapter 11 could become the forum for
private parties to litigate issues that are bound to bedevil the WTO for the
foreseeable future. These issues relate principally to the disparities in the
regulatory environments that exist in the various countries engaged in
cross-border trade. Should a regulation that disproportionately burdens
foreign companies be struck down even if it is not intended to discriminate
against foreigners? Should a developing country be allowed to trade on its
lesser protection of environmental, labor, consumer or health rights, or may
a developed country justifiably impose trade sanctions intended to level the
playing field? If a developing country may use lesser levels of regulation to
attract business, is there any floor that an international tribunal should
articulate in the absence of international consensus? Under Chapter 11, as
written, these questions could become the subject of private party litigation,
and NAFTA plaintiffs seeking damages, rather than states in infrequent
proceedings, would be litigating
WTO issues at the NAFTA level, with a
140
resulting legitimacy problem.
3. Takings

The same problem of meaning, ambiguity and legitimacy arises in the
area of Chapter 11 's takings law. By failing to define what is a "measure
138

Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 82-85.
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140id.
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tantamount to an expropriation," Chapter 11 leaves litigants free to argue
that a broad array of government actions amount to what we call regulatory
takings. 14 1 Under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, decades of
42
precedential evolution can guide a decision in any given takings case.
The Court will carefully assess the investment-backed expectations of the
plaintiff, and will weigh those against an evaluation of the measure at issue
that draws from deeply rooted legal and regulatory practices. 143 An
international panel operating with the guidance and judicial sensitivity
accrued over decades of jurisprudence, on the other hand, may be left with
nothing beyond vague and malleable words to judge whether an entrenched
domestic practice violates international law.
At bottom, the Loewen cases involved attacks that had no legitimate
144
basis in the law of regulatory takings under the U.S. judicial practice.
Loewen challenged punitive damages and unfettered jury verdicts, arguing
that the jury essentially "took" his property by imposing unnecessarily high
punitive damages. 145 This strained reading of what a "measure tantamount
to an expropriation" involves illustrates the potential for a broad
interpretation of the amorphous language of Article 1105.146
The next subsection argues that in the Loewen and Mondev cases the
Chapter 11 panel cases could have engaged explicitly in a proper evaluation
of the object and purpose of the system. 147 In both cases, the panel
ultimately demonstrated an understanding of the relevant Chapter 11
concepts--deference to the rulings of national courts and consideration for
prudential principles limiting interference with state sovereignty-but it
failed 14to8 ground its rulings on an explicit articulation of the principles at
work.

Id. at 84-88.
See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distributionin the Law of
Takings, 112 HARv. L. REv. 997 (1999).
143 See, eg., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(characterizing a cable installer's right of entry as a permanent albeit partial physical
occupation, and therefore a taking); Frank Michelman, Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1987).
141

142

144Compare Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, and Michelman, supra note 143, with Loewen,

ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3, 44.
145 See Loewen, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3, T 44.
146 NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1105.
147 Of course, according to customary international law, as expressed in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, a treaty must be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose. See, e..g, Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 94 (ICJ 2004).
148 Loewen, TT 208-40; Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.
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B. Arbitrariness, Anti-Discrimination and National Takings Law: the
Fundamental Common Law Principles of Chapter 11.
This subsection reviews each of the common law principles that
should guide Chapter 11 panels in interpreting the treaty, and explains how
the Mondev and the Loewen decisions might be explained as furthering and
applying these principles to limit the Chapter to its proper scope. In
addition, it discusses the prudential concerns that the Mondev and Loewen
panels followed to limit Chapter 11 to supplement the common law
principles described above, but that they filed to explicitly articulate.
Start with the notion of arbitrariness.1 49 At issue in Mondev was the
extent to which a government may immunize official actors from
liability. x0 As with punitive damages, immunity carries the potential for
arbitrariness. By definition, the body that receives immunity has violated
the law and, except for its special status, would be liable to the plaintiff.
However, considerations separate from grounds for liability make the
defendant immune from prosecution.1 5' These considerations include,
usually, logistical and practical concerns for the proper functioning of
government, as well as the need for certain actors to operate free from legal
constraints. 52 For example, a firefighter requires a certain degree of
immunity from civil liability. 53 The firefighter is engaged in a highly
dangerous activity, where accusations of negligence or neglect of duty may
easily be brought forth in hindsight. If fire departments could be subjected
to negligence lawsuits without an additional layer of protection, they would
likely be dragged into endless litigation that could potentially bankrupt their
treasuries (probably in legal fees alone). Firefighters in the field, therefore,
might be deterred from doing their jobs to the best of their judgment. In
order to avoid this state of affairs, a legislative body might immunize a fire
department against all negligence-based lawsuits,
54 or shelter it from liability
altogether for performance of its public duties.
The Mondev panel properly recognized the limits of Chapter 11 with
respect to a legislative grant of immunity. 55 It created an arbitrary floor,
for which governments must be held accountable if they fall below. 56 The
149 Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 46-49. Arbitrariness should be the lynchpin of

Chapter I l's international law analysis because, by definition, it involves no countervailing,
important governmental interest.
150 Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,

139-156.
151See, e.g., Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993) (discussing

immunity rationale).

See, e.g., Eyssi v. City of Lawrence, 618 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1993).
13 See id. at 197-98.
154 id.
155 Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
140-50.
156 Id.
151-54.
152
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panel limited its findings to the facts of that case. 157 Clearly it intended to
put governments on notice that future dispositions of the immunity issue
might not go as well if the regulating authority did not respect the NAFTA
ban on arbitrary government action. Much as a constitutional court controls
government action by requiring that a reasonable relationship exists
between the means and objective, the Chapter 11 panel protected the
foreign investors' interests by requiring that a valid reason exist for the
grant of statutory immunity. 1 8 However, because the grant of immunity
fell short of arbitrary action, the Panel properly refrained from interfering
with the legislature's judgment.'
It did not express any view as to the
desirability of immunity in a given setting; as long as there was a
particularized, reasonable ground for
the legislation, the panel would not
160
interfere with domestic jurisdiction.
This ruling makes eminent sense when evaluated in light of an
understanding of the object and purpose of Article 1105 as banning
arbitrary treatment. In today's financial world, arbitrariness is one of the
most powerful deterrents to investment. Certainty and predictability are
core elements of the cross-border investor's panoply. By insisting on a
legitimate governmental purpose, the NAFTA panel upheld the investment
protective goals of the Chapter, all the while respecting national sovereignty
over an important domestic norm. However, the panel should have
expressly grounded its ruling on this view of customary international law of
investment. By including a standard that is amenable to being applied and
interpreted in future cases, such as arbitrariness, the panel would have
infused some meaning into the notion of "international law" and resolved
the legitimacy crisis that arises from the ambiguous meaning of the text.
In Loewen, the tribunal properly rejected challenges based on Article
1102 and Article 11 10, but then had to turn to prudential considerations in
finally rejecting Loewen's claim under international law. 161 First consider
national treatment and takings, and let us understand why the panel was
right to reject Loewen's claims on these counts. With respect to Loewen's
national treatment claim under Article 1102, the crux of Loewen's
argument was that the corporation was selected for discriminatory treatment
because it is Canadian. 162 I have argued that, in order to distinguish Chapter
11 national treatment claims from broader national treatment cases that
unjustifiably infringe on sovereignty issues, a Chapter 11 panel must focus
on whether there is sufficient evidence of economic protectionism (or,
157

id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160Id. at

154.

161Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
162

Id.

139-40.

150-62.
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conversely, whether
a State interest unrelated to economic protectionism
63
may be found).1
If a court intentionally discriminates against a foreign party, the
foreign party's costs of doing business in a given jurisdiction increase,
putting the investor at a disadvantage vis-A-vis domestic competitors. There
is no difference between such a situation and a case where a regulation
imposes a greater burden on foreigners than it does on local enterprise. In
both instances, the measure may be challenged under Chapter 11, and it will
not infringe on national sovereignty because the practice of discrimination
is clear-cut and not countervailed by any domestic interest unrelated to
economic protectionism.
However, in Loewen, the discrimination that took place was not based
on the nationality of the defendant. As the United States claimed, there is
no reason to believe that Mr. Gary would have argued his case any
differently had Loewen been a New York company.'
In fact, he might
have stoked more prejudice had he been able to point to Yankee corporate
interests, rather than to those of our calmer neighbors to the North. In
addition, the biases to which Mr. Gary appealed were primarily class
based. 165 The imagery was that of the greedy corporate interests taking
advantage of the "little guy.' 6 6 Repeated references to Mr. Loewen's yacht
and tycoon business habits, in contrast with the quaint, wholesome and
local nature of the plaintiffs personality and business, dominated the trial
discourse. 167 In other words, the discrimination, was part and parcel of a
jury system that accommodates local attitudes and allows for a certain
amount of prejudice and stereotyping to affect a decision, but it could not
be said to primarily reflect economic discrimination against foreign
interests. 68
Likewise, regarding the takings claim, the panel was correct to find
that Loewen's argument was without merit. Here, Chapter 11 did not reach
any farther than the domestic law on takings. 69 It is clear, under the
163 Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 89-90. See also Not in My Backyard, supra note

35.
164
The United States' argument was noted by the panel. Loewen, ICSID Case No.
ARB/(AF)/98/3, 70.
165

Id.

39, 68-70.

166 Id. TT 68-70.

167Id.

68.

168 As touched on below, infra note 201, there is also a State interest in allowing appeals
to jurors' prejudice; however misguided that policy may be, it allows in U.S. trial practice
for community views to find their expression in a verdict on liability. Foreign intervention
and meddling with such a practice would unsettle the domestic equilibrium, and would
therefore raise serious legitimacy questions. In these circumstances, then, it was proper for
the NAFTA panels to dismiss the national treatment claim.
169 Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 42-50. See also Not in My Backyard, supra note
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applicable U.S. jurisprudence, that a jury verdict of this type does not
constitute a taking or a regulatory taking actionable in federal court.170 This
case illustrates the absurdity of going through a regulatory takings analysis
without the guidance provided by national law.
Under a literal
interpretation, it may be argued that a defendant in any jury case has a
protected property interest: the right not to have assets seized and attached
in satisfaction of a judgment that is not warranted by facts or law. Any
arbitrary decision, under this logic, would give rise to a counterclaim
against the government because, by enforcing the award, the sheriff or other
local official is taking the property of the defendant.
The difficult aspects of the Loewen case, and its most instructive
portions, relate to the international law pillar of Chapter 11. Here, Loewen
had (as mentioned above) a valid Chapter 11 case. The Mississippi trial
involved a national practice with profound economic consequences: the
award of punitive damages to deter wrongful behavior. The American legal
system's endorsement of punitive damages is in tension with international
practice, 171 so it is not surprising that a NAFTA panel would find the award
of large monetary sums in tension with international law. Loewen's
submission to the NAFTA panel included compelling evidence that the trial
was botched and did not satisfy minimal standards of justice. 7 2 In its
pleadings, Loewen supplied an affidavit by the former president of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), stating that an award of punitive
173
damages under those circumstances violated customary international law.
Repeatedly, the company pointed to the magnitude of the award, which was
so disproportionate to the harm incurred.174 While most of the U.S. officials
would concede that a half-billion dollar verdict is excessive, many found it
unsettling to know that an integral component of civil actions in the United
States might be scrutinized internationally. 175
This sentiment was
especially resonant because tort reform has been a vigorously debated issue
35.
170 Fifth Amendment jurisprudence turns not only on substantive due process but the
procedural variant also. By definition, the delivery of a jury verdict presupposes "due
process of law." Moreover, U.S. case law on takings has heretofore considered only
deprivation of property rights when it concerns real property interests. See, e.g., Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 123 (1978).
71 See Affidavit of Sir Robert Jennings, on file with author.
172 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3, 119 ("By any standard of measurement,
the trial involving O'Keefe and Loewen was a disgrace.").
173 See Affidavit of Sir Robert Jennings, on file with author.
174 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
46, 96-113.
175 See, e.g., Note, 'Common Sense' Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1765 (1996).
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in the United States for many years, making democratic consensus all the
more important. 176 If a judgment limiting punitive damages was left to
stand, it would be seen as a flagrant assault on the processes by which
political legitimacy is established.
In addition, the case raised important issues related to the
administration of justice in the United States. The United States is known
177
throughout the world as a bad place for corporate defendants to litigate.
The reasons for fearing the U.S. system are numerous. One most obvious is
that juries are said to use punitive damages gratuitously to punish what
cunning lawyers for the plaintiff depict as gross violations of justice. 178 At
the end of the day, whether in the Bronx or in Hinds County, Mississippi,
the U.S. justice system contains a series of pitfalls for the unwary that
foreign business interests might do best to avoid-as would their similarly
situated domestic counterparts.
Regardless of the sensitivity of the issue, however, the facts supported
Loewen's denial of justice under international law. The concept of "denial
of justice" as commonly understood under international law lies at the core
of Article 1105. 179 The notion conjures up images of kangaroo courts
blindly favoring local interests, which are deterrent to investment and the
security of property rights. By definition, a denial of justice is arbitrary. In
a case where a party otherwise would be entitled to redress, he or she is shut
out of the court on account of a fundamental defect in the legal system. If
arbitrary means "without reason," there is virtually no better application of
the concept than in the denial of justice context: There is no legitimate
reason, in any jurist's mind, why someone entitled to redress should not
receive it just because the local system produces unfair results.
Applying the concept of arbitrariness, a strong argument could be
made for Loewen's victory before the NAFTA panel. Putting aside
technical difficulties with Loewen's case to reach the merits of its claim, it
is beyond doubt that the panel was right when it held that Loewen was
denied justice.'8 0 The trial was simply a mockery. Willie Gary, his talent
notwithstanding, mostly provided a lesson in the effective use of jury
inflammation,"' and blatant appeals to their xenophobia and other
prejudices. 182 He shifted attention away from the facts and pitted the "little

176 ld.

177 See Blumberg, supra note 131, at 504-06.
178
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179Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,

132 (stating "[m]anifest injustice in the

sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial
propriety is enough..
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guy" against "corporate greed," in terms that evoked epic battles of good
versus evil. 183 The judge simply abdicated his responsibilities, brazenly
stating that in his view lawyers should be free to play the "race card," and
84
knowing full well that only the plaintiff could85 benefit from this tactic.
The jurors bought the scenario wholeheartedly.1
The Mississippi Supreme Court abdicated its appellate responsibility
as well. 186 Loewen gave reasonable assurances that it would not squander
its assets pending a trial, yet the court insisted on the posting of a bond that
was impossible to procure.1 87 If arbitrariness is indeed the yardstick, it
would be hard to find a clearer instance than in the conduct of the judicial
authorities that oversaw the Loewen trial.
188
Yet, the Chapter 11 panel did not rule against the United States.
Instead, the tribunal chastised the State of Mississippi for its demonstrated
lack of commitment to justice.18 9 It intimated that disproportionately high
punitive damages might, in proper circumstances, be the subject of a valid
Chapter 11 action, especially when administered in a case where due
process is not respected.' 90 However, the panel relied on Loewen's failure
to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court and on the general
international law principle that domestic remedies must be exhausted (i.e.,
the "finality principle"), to dismiss Loewen's claim. 19 1 In my view, this
result was justified not because of the reason stated by the tribunal, but
because it was rooted in a healthy dose of realism in the application of
international law, with a view to minimizing domestic challenges to the
legitimacy of the international law.
In order to illustrate this point, let me go back to a decision of the
European Court of Justice in an early case that arose under the provisions of
European law dealing with measures burdening intra-Community trade. In
Torfaen Borough, the Court was asked to determine if the United
Kingdom's Sunday closing laws violate European norms. 192 Under the
applicable legal structure, the Court had to hold that the measures were a
burden on trade, but that it would be justified if it furthered a valid

183
184

Id.
Id. 65.

185 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,

54-70.

186 Id. IT 53-54.

181 Id. 77 5-7, 39, 48-51.
188 Id. T$ 162, 165, 215-17.
189 Id. TT 137.
190 Id.

191Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
142-71.
192 Case C-145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q, 1989 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS
6265.
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government purpose.1 93 It is evident, however, that the Court could not
hold, while remaining consistent with democratic principles of separation of
church and state, that the U.K. government could promote the Christian
Sabbath. 19 4 That left a dearth of rationale for the government to justify its
burdening of trade. In order to achieve its goal, the Court scrambled to
explain that a single day of rest may properly be instituted to ensure that all
workers are off at approximately the same time.1 95 While disconnected
from the reality of the Sunday closing law's purpose, this reasoning
guaranteed that the law would remain in force and, more fundamentally, the
ruling avoided a clash with the U.K. public that was weary of European
domination and 196
unwilling to give up local mores as a result of laissezfaire
trade pressures.
Like Torfaen Borough, the Loewen case was the first challenge under
Chapter 11 to a measure adopted by the United States. 197 As described
above, there was an outcry in the United States against even the suggestion
that a supranational tribunal could review sensitive domestic policies like
punitive damages, tort liability, and justice. 198 It is true, critics admit, that
the United States should engage in a debate over whether reforms should be
adopted on those issues.
We should balance the extent to which our
commitment to individual justice outweighs the efficient operation of
businesses. We should think about due process, and whether punitive
damages may be so overly disproportionate to the actual harm as to
constitute an unacceptable punishment of the defendant. However, the
critics would claim these are essentially domestic questions that an
international panel may not legitimately determine.
In other words, in the Loewen case, the international system tapped
193Id.

13.

I heard the insight that the Court had to find a social objective for the measure
separate from the furtherance of religion in a course taught from my teacher and mentor,
Professor Joseph Weiler.
195 Torfaen Borough, 1989 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 6265,
13-14.
196Fears in the United Kingdom might have been particularly relevant since this was the
very first case to come out of the United Kingdom in this area of trade law.
197NAFTA Chapter I l's history of cases is relatively brief: S.D. Myers v. Canada,
Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/documents/myersvcanadapartialaward final 13-11-00.pdf; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, Award of Damages (May 31, 2002), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caltnanac/documents/damage award.pdf; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/
sphp-pages/importa/sol-contro/consultoria/Casos-Mexico/Metalclad/audo/laudoingles.pdf
Another case involving U.S. regulatory practice, Methanex v. United States, succeeded
Loewen and is still pending. First Partial Award (Aug. 7, 2002) available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf.
194

198 See, e.g. PUBLIC CITIZEN,
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into a national debate over the extent to which certain practices are
arbitrary, and it threatened to take an outlier case as the vehicle to impose
an international norm on the debate. It was more prudent for the
international system to let national actors carry on the debate. The judges
must have recognized that a ruling against the United States would do more
harm than good. It would have given the critics of the treaty an easy
weapon to brandish: international law preempts the jury system, interferes
with the proper administration of justice, and (yet again) favors the rich
against the poor. In these circumstances, it was prudent for the tribunal to
refrain from intervening.2 °0
In addition, in Loewen as in Mondev, the international panels were
asked to intervene in the affairs of the domestic judiciary. 20 1 Not only were
the issues sensitive of their own right, but as the European experience
demonstrates supranational law encounters greater risks of illegitimacy
when it forces or threatens to force domestic judges and courts to change
their normal course of operation. Administration of justice lies at the core
of the domestic private law norms that international law may not displace
without carefully considering the attendant legitimacy problems. 20 2 There
should be a natural and healthy reflex in the good international judge that
prevents her or him from unduly interfering with the work of national
counterparts. That was a factor at work here as well.
However, as described in the next section, the panels should have
explicitly articulated the basis for their decisions. An explicit articulation of
the applicable norms would, as I explain below, resolve the legitimacy
concerns inherent in a potential conflict between sensitive domestic norms
and international standards that is adjudicated under ambiguous language,
confine Chapter 11 to its proper place in the world of international trade and
investment in light of the object and purpose of the treaty, and further the
international common law enterprise.

200

This is not to say that a developed country like the United States gets to hold an

internal debate over which practice is arbitrary in light of contemporary practice, while a less
developed country like Mexico is banned from arguing that historical circumstances should
inform what is arbitrary. The distinction is that Loewen was an example of a judicial practice
that may be the byproduct of a system that is overall not arbitrary, in that it protects the
rights of plaintiffs, and the United States should be free to decide, out of an internal debate,
that the practice should be maintained despite the cost of freak occurrences such as Loewen.
201 Loewen ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3,
42-53, 122, 137; Mondev, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 75.
202 See, generally, Caruso, supra note 133.
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C. How Loewen and Mondev Could Have Been Drafted to Contribute to
the Development of a Common Law Framework for Interpreting Chapter
11.
Chapter 11 suffers from a legitimacy problem because it threatens to
displace domestic law if its interpreters do not resolve the ambiguity
problems of the treaty. NAFTA is unlike classical trade agreements in that
its dispute resolution mechanisms exist for the benefit of private parties, not
the state.20 3 Plaintiffs are broadly defined as foreign investors, while
defendants are host governments. Each state actor party agrees to surrender
some of its rights in exchange for the protection and security that
accompanies membership to the polity at large. 204 Depending on how
Chapter 11 is interpreted, supranational law may unduly favor the interests
of investors over the domestic norms that they will challenge using the
treaty.
These propositions are reflected in both Mondev and Loewen. The
Mondev tribunal acknowledged that the plaintiff's argument against blanket
statutory immunity had merit. 205 The Loewen tribunal came close to
denouncing a whole range of state trial practices in the United States,
especially since the tribunal determined that the corporate plaintiff was
denied justice.20 6 These arbitral decisions could have ushered in victories
not only for the Canadian litigants involved, but for private interests
generally. Every decision that favors (or at least sympathizes with)
investors at the expense of government policies elevates the status of
foreign enterprise in all three member states. That is, a victory for
Canadian business over the U.S. government bodes well for the U.S.
ventures in Canada and Mexico, should the parties' rights and privileges
ever be called into question.20 7 The flip side of this alignment, of course, is
that NAFTA panels' construction of customary international law may
invalidate countervailing domestic norms, thereby further polarizing the
goals of government and business and the opposing sides in the debate over
the legitimacy of Chapter 11.
In order to resolve this tension and to facilitate the cross border flow of
investment without unsettling the equilibrium between domestic and
NAFTA, supra note 1; see also DUNOFF, supra note 44, at 811.
of course making the assumption that, without NAFTA's Chapter 11, investment
would not flow into the Mexican market. See Vandevelde, supra note 11.
205 Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 151.
206 Loewen, ICISD Case No. ARB/(AF)/98/3, 137.
207 E.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Award of Damages, Nov.
13,
2000),
available at http://naftaclaims.com/disputes-canada/disputes_canada_
sdmyers.htm (finding that Canadian legislation prohibiting toxic waste exports unfairly
blocked a US competitor from entering the market). It should be noted, however, that the
case was decided under national treatment, not customary international law.
203
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international law, the tribunals should explicitly state their grounds for
resolving the ambiguity inherent in Chapter 11. The Mondev and Loewen
decisions could have been victories for a common law approach that would
not only follow a teleological methodology, but also take the pulse of the
extent to which the international law should take grounds within the
domestic legal system, and at what pace. In order to refrain from falling
prey to the pitfalls encountered (but avoided) in Mondev and Loewen, the
NAFTA panels need to follow and explicitly articulate a methodology, such
as the one advocated in this article, and to continue to reconstruct Chapter
11 in a way that comports with its object and purpose.
In addition to resolving ambiguity in Chapter Il 's meaning and
correlatively to resolving its legitimacy problem, such an approach would
further the development of the "common law" in international trade.20 8
Professor Joseph Weiler has observed that cross-fertilization among various
international fields has been taking place with increasing frequency.20 9
Since the world of private international law is no longer discretely divided
into EU, NAFTA, or WTO specializations (among others), some ideas,
aided by significant collaborative efforts, are surfacing in numerous
contexts. 2 1 It is not inappropriate, therefore, to suggest that principles
being employed in trade at large are also relevant to Chapter 1I's
provisions on investment.
If NAFTA were to examine these nascent common law principles, it
would likely scale back the number and species of cases over which it
asserts jurisdiction. A careful reading of Mondev and Loewen testifies to
the tribunals' difficulty with adhering to NAFTA's charter while staying
above the political fray.2 1 But if NAFTA jurists reinvent their notion of
how Chapter I I's provisions function to protect investors, they can
sidestep, in large part, the interpretative problems addressed previously. If
they accomplish this task, the NAFTA panels would revert back to their
original object and purpose (i.e. commercial arbitration where cases with
far-reaching implications are typically avoided). Then, NAFTA's panels
might resemble conventional arbitral panels that resolve money disputes
that do not implicate sensitive state interests. Adopting this
2 12 approach
would narrow Chapter I's authority but deepen its legitimacy.
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In concrete terms, the key to executing this shift of purpose is to focus
on resolving cases where purely protectionist or arbitrary measures are at
work, and not to entertain regulatory takings claims that go beyond what is
actionable under local law. In addition, the panels should engage in a
separate process, illustrated by the Loewen case, to evaluate any prudential
consideration arising from the relationship between the national and
international spheres that militate against intervention in domestic affairs.
Arbitrary or discriminatory measures may span a broad variety of
subject matter areas. In each instance, a NAFTA tribunal would not be
required to engage in a careful balancing test in which foreign investors'
needs are weighed against an important national interest; by definition, an
arbitrary act is one without justification and a discriminatory act furthers
economic protectionism only-not an unrelated, valid state interest. In
addition, the prudential level of the analysis will act as a safety net to ensure
that, even when an action might be viewed as arbitrary or discriminatory (as
in Loewen), the panel might still reject a claim because ruling in favor of
the private parties would unsettle the balance between the domestic and the
international realms. 13
Unlike Loewen or Mondev, where intervention was inappropriate, the
cases that are properly subject to Chapter 11 intervention do not necessitate
a careful weighing of interests-national versus supranational, public
versus private-which is best left to other adjudicative channels.2 14
Adopting a more narrow view of its competence will enable Chapter 11 to
regain its footing.
Obviously, for those concerned about national
sovereignty, an agreement to hear cases only when well-established, deeply
entrenched practices are not being litigated would be welcome news. In
addition, investors can still be adequately protected under NAFTA's
auspices without having to guess whether or not tribunals will follow their
own interpretations of the investment chapter. This kind of security is one
that will sustain the treaty's viability over the long haul, as confusion and
cynicism in North American business communities gradually subside.
These principles should be clearly articulated by panels, rather than
inferred from the result after the fact. The tone of the panels' decision in
Loewen and Mondev gives cause for hope. 215 The opinions were
transparent, thoroughly researched and well-written.
They were
reminiscent of a well reasoned U.S. appellate court opinion. The issue of
legitimacy has much to do with transparency and issuing judgments that
213 Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16; see also Not in My Backyard, supra note 35.
214 See Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16. Outside of domestic legal remedies, cases that
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have the hallmarks of those rendered by national courts. To that extent, the
NAFTA panels did well in both cases. It remains necessary for them to
explicitly articulate principles that will formally guide their decisions in
future cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 's legitimacy crisis was brought about by the potential for
its broad construction of "investment" and, therefore, the broad jurisdiction
it assumed over all kinds of commercial disputes-including those
requiring the kind of strict scrutiny for which NAFTA jurists are not
particularly well-suited.21 6 As a result, natural tensions imbued in the
treaty's structure were exacerbated; national, supranational, public, and
private interests all seemed to be shortchanged. The very fact that decisions
such as those in Mondev and Loewen were rendered brought
17 the conflict to
a head, further casting Chapter 11 's usefulness into doubt.
This article proposes a solution that may, over time, help to achieve
Chapter 11 's original object and purpose. As NAFTA looks south to the
future FTAA, it is crucial to resolve any lingering ambiguities about the
meaning of foreign investment. Borrowing concepts used in the larger
world of international trade, I have suggested that Chapter 11 panels reduce
their caseload by adjudicating only those disputes in which no important
national (or public) objective, institution, or practice is at stake. If such a
change can be agreed to, the three-state coalition may very well evolve into
a more mature polity in its own right. And, equally important, it would help
solidify the development of an international common law capable of
negotiating boundaries in national and global contexts.
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